The phenomena of indecision and suspension loom large in both philosophy and psychology. Whereas psychology discusses related phenomena in practical tasks and mostly pathological terms, philosophy strives for conceptual clarification and emphasizes the ubiquity and variety of suspension.
In this chapter, we use fast-and-frugal trees (FFTs) as a drosophila model for developing a positive account of suspension in decision-making. Being designed for handling binary classification tasks, FFTs seem particularly ill-suited for accommodating a third stance. But by replacing one decision outcome by a do not know category or adding it as a third option, we can adapt and extend the FFT framework to explore the causes and consequences of suspension.
Considering the distributions of decision outcomes and contrasting the performance of alternative models in terms of cost-benefit trade-offs illustrates the power of this methodology. Overall, a model-based approach provides surprising insights into the functions and mechanisms of suspension and serves as a productive tool for thinking.
fast-and-frugal trees (FFTs), judgment and decision making (JDM), heuristics, binary classification, cost-benefit trade-offs, indecision, computer modeling, philosophy, machine learning, suspension
Related: FFTrees: An R toolbox to create, visualize, and evaluate FFTs
Resources: 10.4324/9781003474302-20 | Download PDF | Google Scholar
An example of an FFT predicting the risk of having heart disease.
Nathaniel Phillips, Hansjörg Neth, Jan Woike, Wolfgang Gaissmaier
Abstract: Fast-and-frugal trees (FFTs) are simple algorithms that facilitate efficient and accurate decisions based on limited information. But despite their successful use in many applied domains, there is no widely available toolbox that allows anyone to easily create, visualize, and evaluate FFTs. We fill this gap by introducing the R package FFTrees.
Hansjörg Neth, Björn Meder, Amit Kothiyal, Gerd Gigerenzer
Abstract: What — if anything — can psychology and decision science contribute to risk management in financial institutions? The turmoils of recent economic crises undermine the assumptions of classical economic models and threaten to dethrone Homo oeconomicus, who aims to make decisions by weighing and integrating all available information. But rather than proposing to replace the rational actor model with some notion of biased, fundamentally flawed and irrational agents, we advocate the alternative notion of Homo heuristicus, who uses simple, but ecologically rational strategies to make sound and robust decisions. Based on the conceptual distinction between risky and uncertain environments this paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence that boundedly rational agents prefer simple heuristics over more flexible models. We provide examples of successful heuristics, explain when and why heuristics work well, and illustrate these insights with a fast and frugal decision tree that helps to identify fragile banks. We conclude that all members of the financial community will benefit from simpler and more transparent products and regulations.